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Abstract 
A general notion of algebraic conditional plausi­
bility measures is defined. Probability measures, 
ranking functions, possibility measures, and (un­
der the appropriate definitions) sets of probability 
measures can all be viewed as defining algebraic 
conditional plausibility measures. It is shown 
that the technology of Bayesian networks can be 
applied to algebraic conditional plausibility mea­
sures. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Pearl [1988] among others has long argued that Bayesian 
networks (that is, the dags without the conditional prob­
ability tables) represent important qualitative information 
about uncertainty regarding conditional dependencies and 
independencies. To the extent that this is true, Bayesian 
networks should make perfect sense for non-probabilistic 
representations of uncertainty. And, indeed, Bayesian net­
works have been used with K, rankings [Spohn 1988] by 
Darwiche and Goldszmidt [1994]. It follows from results 
of Wilson [1994] that the technology of Bayesian networks 
can also be applied to possibility measures [Dubois and 
Prade 1990]. 
The question I address in this paper is "What properties 
of a representation of uncertainty are required in order for 
the technology of Bayesian networks to work?" This ques­
tion too has been addressed in earlier work, see [Darwiche 
1992; Darwiche and Ginsberg 1992; Friedman and Halpern 
1995; Wilson 1994], although the characterization given 
here is somewhat different. Here I represent uncertainty 
using plausibility measures , as in [Friedman and Halpern 
1995]. To answer the question, I must examine general 
properties of conditional plausibility as well as defining a 
notion of plausibilistic independence. Unlike earlier pa­
pers, I enforce a symmetry condition in the definition of 
conditional independence, so that, for example, A is inde­
pendent of B iff B is independent of A. While this property 
holds for probability, under the asymmetric definition of in­
dependence used in earlier work it does not necessarily hold 
for other formalisms. There are also subtle but important 
differences between this paper and [Friedman and Halpern 
1995] in the notion of conditional plausibility. The defini­
tions here are simpler but more general; particular attention 
is paid here to conditions on when the conditional plausi­
bility must be defined. 
The major results here are a general condition, simpler 
than that given in [Friedman and Halpern 1995; Wilson 
1994], under which a conditional plausibility measure sat­
isfies the semi-graphoid properties (which means it can be 
represented using a Bayesian network). There is also a 
weak condition that suffices to guarantee that d-separation 
in the network characterizes conditional independence. The 
conditions clearly apply to K, rankings and possibility mea­
sures. Perhaps more interestingly, they also apply to sets 
of probabilities under a novel representation of such sets as 
a plausibility measure. This novel representation (and the 
associated notion of conditioning) is shown to have some 
natural properties not shared by other representations. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I 
discuss conditional plausibility measures. Section 3 intro­
duces algebraic conditional plausibility measures, which 
are ones where there is essentially an analogue to + and 
x. (Putting such an algebraic structure on uncertainty is 
not new; it was also done in [Darwiche 1992; Darwiche 
and Ginsberg 1992; Friedman and Halpern 1995; Weydert 
1994].) Section 4 discusses independence and conditional 
independence in conditional plausibility spaces, and shows 
that algebraic conditional plausibility measures satisfy the 
semi-graphoid properties. Finally, in Section 5, Bayesian 
networks based on (algebraic) plausibility measures are 
considered. Combining the fact that algebraic plausibil­
ity measures satisfy the semi-graphoid properties with the 
results of [Geiger, Verma, and Pearl 1990], it follows that 
d-separation in a Bayesian network G implies conditional 
independence for all algebraic plausibility measures com­
patible with G; a weak richness condition is shown to yield 
the converse. The paper concludes in Section 6. For rea­
sons of space, proofs are omitted; they can be found in the 
full paper. 
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2 CONDITIONAL PLAUSIBILITY 
The basic idea behind plausibility measures is straightfor­
ward. A probability measure maps subsets of a set W to 
[0, 1]. Its domain may not consist of all subsets of W; how­
ever, it is required to be an algebra. (Recall that an algebra 
F over W is a set of subsets of W containing W and closed 
under union and complementation, so that if U, V E F, 
then so are U U V and U.) A plausibility measure is more 
general; it maps elements in an algebra F to some arbitrary 
partially ordered set. If PI is a plausibility measure, then we 
read Pl(U) as "the plausibility of set U". IfPl(U) ::; Pl(V), 
then V is at least as plausible as U. Because the ordering 
is partial, it could be that the plausibility of two different 
sets is incomparable. An agent may not be prepared to say 
of two sets that one is more likely than another or that they 
are equal in likelihood. 
Formally, a plausibility space is a tuple S = (W, F, PI), 
where W is a set of worlds, F is an algebra over W, and PI 
maps sets in F to some set D of plausibility values partially 
ordered by a relation ::;D (so that ::;Dis reflexive, transitive, 
and anti-symmetric) that contains two special elements T D 
and .lD such that .lD ::;D d ::;D T D for all d E D. In 
the case of probability measures, T D and .lD are 1 and 0, 
respectively. As usual, the ordering is defined <D by taking 
d1 <D d2 if d1 ::;D d2 and d1 -=f. d2. I omit the subscript 
D from ::;D, <D. T D and .lD whenever it is clear from 
context. 
There are three requirements on plausibility measures. The 
first two are obvious analogues of requirements that hold 
for other notions of uncertainty: the whole space gets the 
maximum plausibility and the empty set gets the minimum 
plausibility. The third requirement says that a set must be 
at least as plausible as any of its subsets. 
Pll. Pl(0) = .lD. 
Pl2. Pl(W ) = T D· 
Pl3. If U � U', then Pl(U) ::; Pl(U'). 
(In Pl3, I am implicitly assuming that U, U' E F. Similar 
assumptions are made throughout.) 
All the standard representations of uncertainty in the liter­
ature can be represented as plausibility measures. I briefly 
describe some other representations of uncertainty that will 
be of relevance to this paper. 
Sets of probabilities: One common way of representing 
uncertainty is by a set of probability measures. This set is 
often assumed to be convex (see, for example, [Campos and 
Moral 1995; Couso, Moral, and Walley 1999; Walley 1991] 
and the references therein), however, convex sets do not 
seem appropriate for representing independence assump­
tions, so I do not make this restriction here. For example, 
if a coin with an unknown probability of heads is tossed 
twice, and the tosses are known to be independent, it seems 
that a reasonable representation is given by the set Po con­
sisting of all measures /la, where lla ( hh) = a2, lla ( ht) = 
Jla(th) = a(1- a),Jla(tt) = (1- a?. Unfortunately, 
Po is not convex. Moreover, its convex hull includes many 
measures for which the coin tosses are not independent. It 
is argued in [Couso, Moral, and Walley 1999] that a set of 
probability measures is behaviorally equivalent to its con­
vex hull. However, even if we accept this argument, it 
does not follow that a set and its convex hull are equivalent 
insofar as determination of independencies goes. 
There are a number of ways of viewing a set P of probabil­
ity measures as a plausibility measure. One uses the lower 
probability P*, defined as P*(U) = inf{Jl(U) : 11 E P}. 
Clearly P* satisfies Pll-3. The corresponding upper prob­
ability P*, defined as P*(U) = sup{ Jl : 11 E P} = 
1 - P*(U), is also clearly a plausibility measure. 
Both P* and P* give a way of comparing the likeli­
hood of two subsets U and V of W. These two ways 
are incomparable; it is easy to find a set P of proba­
bility measures on W and subsets U and V of W such 
that P*(U) < P*(V) and P*(U) > P*(V). Rather 
than choosing between P * and P*, we can associate a 
different plausibility measure with P that captures both. 
Let DP.,P· = {(a,b): 0::; a::; b::; 1} and define 
(a, b)::; (a',b') iff b::; a'. This puts a partial order on 
Dp.,p•, with .lDP •. P• = (0, 0) and TDP •. P• = (1, 1). 
Define Plp.,p· (U) = (P*(U), P*(U)). Thus, Plp.,p· as­
sociates with a set U two numbers which can be thought 
of as defining an interval in terms of the lower and upper 
probability of U. It is easy to check that Plp., p• satisfies 
Pll-3, so it is indeed a plausibility measure, but one which 
puts only a partial order on events. 
The trouble with P*, P*, and even PIP.,P· is that they 
lose information. For example, it is not hard to find a set 
P of probability measures and subsets U, V of W such 
that Jl(U) ::; Jl(V) for all 11 E P and Jl(U) < Jl(V) for 
some 11 E P, but P*(U) = P*(V) and P*(U) = P*(V). 
Indeed, there exists an infinite set P of probability measures 
such that Jl(U) < Jl(V) for all11 E P but P*(U) = P*(V) 
and P*(U) = P*(V). If all the probability measures in P 
agree that U is less likely than V, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that U is less likely than V. However, none of 
P*, P*, or Plp.,p• will necessarily draw this conclusion. 
Fortunately, it is not hard to associate yet another plau­
sibility measure with P that does not lose this important 
information. Let Dp = [0, 1]P with the pointwise order­
ing, so that f ::; g iff f(ll) ::; g(Jl) for all Jl E P. Note that 
.lDp is the function f : P---> [0, 1] such that f(ll) = 0 for 
all Jl E P and T Dp is the function g such that g(Jl) = 1 
for all 11 E P. For U � W, let fu be the function such 
that fu(Jl) = 11(U) for all 11 E P. For example, for 
the set Po of measures representing the two coin tosses, 
the set W taken to be { hh, ht, tt, th }. Then, for example 
f{hh}(lla) = lla(hh) = a2 and i{ht,tt}(lla) = 1- a. 
It is easy to see that, in general, !0 = .lDp and fw = T Dp. 
Now define Plp(U) = fu. Thus, Plp(U) ::; Plp(V) iff 
fu(Jl) ::; fv(Jl) for all 11 E P iff Jl(U) ::; Jl(V) for all 
11 E P. Clearly Plp satisfies Pll-3. Pll and Pl2 follow 
since Plp(0) = !0 = .lDp and Plp(W ) = fw = T Dp• 
while Pl3 follows since if U � V then Jl(U) ::; Jl(V) for 
all11 E P. Plp captures all the information in P (unlike, 
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say, P., which washes much of it away by taking infs). 
This way of associating a plausibility measure with a set 
P of probability measures generalizes: it provides an ap­
proach to associating a single plausibility measure with any 
set of plausibility measures; I leave the straightforward de­
tails to the reader. 
Possibility measures: A possibility measure Poss on 
W is a function mapping subsets of W to [0, !] 
such that Poss(W) 1, Poss(0) 0, and 
Poss(U) = supwEu(Poss({w})), so that Poss(U U V) = 
max(Poss(U), Poss(V)) [Dubois and Prade 1990]. Clearly 
a possibility measure is a plausibility measure. 
Ranking functions: An ordinal ranking (or K-ranking 
or ranking function) K on W (as defined by [Goldszmidt 
and Pearl 1992], based on ideas that go back to [Spohn 
1988]) is a function mapping subsets of W to IN* = 
IN U { oo} such that K(W) = 0, K(0) = oo, and K(U) = 
minwEU(K( { w} )), so that K(U U V) = min(K(U), K(V) ). 
Intuitively, a ranking function assigns a degree of surprise to 
each subset of worlds in W, where 0 means unsurprising and 
higher numbers denote greater surprise. It is easy to see that 
if K is a ranking function on W, then (W, 2 w, K) is a plausi­
bility space, where x 5.JN· y if and only if y 5_ x under the 
usual ordering on the ordinals. One standard view of a rank­
ing function, going back to Spohn, is that a ranking of k can 
be associated with a probability of Ek, for some fixed (possi­
bly infinitesimal) E. Note that this viewpoint justifies taking 
K(W) = 0, K(0) = oo, and K(UuV) = min(K(U), K(V)). 
Since Bayesian networks make such heavy use of condition­
ing, my interest here is not just plausibility measures, but 
conditional plausibility measures (cpm's). Given a set W of 
worlds, a cpm maps pairs of subsets of W to some partially 
ordered set D. I write Pl(UIV) rather than Pl(U, V), in 
keeping with standard notation for conditioning. In the case 
of a probability measure J.L, it is standard to take J.L(UIV) 
to be undefined in J.L(V) = 0. In general, we must make 
precise what the allowable second arguments are. Thus, I 
take the domain of a cpm to have the form F x F' where, 
intuitively, F' consists of those sets in F on which it makes 
sense to condition. For example, if we start with an uncon­
ditional probability measure J.L, F' might consist of all sets 
V such that J.L(V) > 0. (Note that F' is not an algebra-it 
is not closed under either intersection or complementation.) 
A Popper algebra over W is a set F x F' of subsets of 
W x W satisfying the following properties: 
Ace 1. F is an algebra over W. 
Acc2. F' is a nonempty subset of F. 
Acc3. F' is closed under supersets in F, in that if V E F', 
V � V', and V' E F, then V' E F'. 
(Popper algebras are named after Karl Popper, who was the 
first to consider conditional probability as the basic notion 
[Popper 1968].) 
A conditional plausibility space (cps) is a tuple 
(W, F, F', PI), where F x F' is a Popper algebra over 
W, PI : F x F' -. D, D is a partially ordered domain 
of plausibility values, and PI is a conditional plausibility 
measure (cpm) that satisfies the following conditions: 
CPll .  Pl(0jV) = ..lD. 
CPI2. Pl(WIV) = T D· 
CP13. If U � U', then PI(UIV) 5_ PI(U'jV). 
CP14 PI(UIV) = PI(U n VjV). 
CPll-3 are the obvious analogues to Pll-3. CP14 is a 
minimal property that guarantees that when conditioning 
on V, everything is relativized to V. It follows easily from 
CP11-4 thatx PI( ·IV) is a plausibility measure on V for each 
fixed V. A cps is acceptable if it satisfies 
Acc4. If V E F', U E F, and Pl(UjV) =/:. ..lD, then 
U n VEF'. 
Acceptability is a generalization of the observation that if 
Pr(V) =/:. 0, then then conditioning on V should be defined. 
It says that if Pl(UIV) =/:. ..lD, then conditioning on V n U 
should be defined. 
This notion of cps is closely related to that defined in [Fried­
man and Halpern 1995]. There, a conditional plausibility 
space is defined to be a family { W,Dv,Plv): V � W} 
of plausibility spaces that satisfies the following coherence 
condition, which relates conditioning on two different sets, 
where F = 2w and F' = 2w- {0}: 
CP15. IfVnV' E F' andU, U' E F, thenPl(UjVnV') 5_ 
PI(U'IV n V') iff Pl(U n VIV') 5:. PI(U' n VIV'). 
It is not hard to show that CP15 implies CP14. However, 
CP15 does not follow from CP11-4 (indeed, as shown below, 
the standard notion of conditioning for lower probabilities 
satisfies CPI1-4 but not CP15). A cps that satisfies CP15 is 
said to be coherent. Although I do not assume CP15 here, 
it in fact holds for all plausibility measures to which one of 
the main results applies (see Lemma 3.2). 
To distinguish the definition of cps given in this paper from 
that given in [Friedman and Halpern 1995], I call the latter 
an FH-cps. There is no analogue to Accl-4 in [Friedman 
and Halpern 1995]; F is imRJicitly taken to be 2w, while 
F' is implicitly taken to be 2 -{0}. This is an inessential 
difference betwen the definitions. More significantly, note 
that in an FH-cps, (W, Dv, Plv) is a plausibility space for 
each fixed V, and thus satisfies Pll-3. However, requiring 
CPll-3 is a priori stronger than requiring Pll-3 for each 
separate plausibility space. Pll requires that Pl(01V) = 
..lDv, but the elements ..lDv may be different for each V. 
By way of contrast, CPll requires that Pl(..iiV) must be 
the same element, ..lD, for all V. Similar remarks hold for 
Pl2. Nevertheless, as I show in the full paper, there is a 
construction that converts an FH-cps to a coherent cps. 
I now consider some standard ways of getting cps's, starting 
with the unconditional representations of uncertainty dis­
cussed earlier. A cpm PI extends an unconditional plausibil­
ity measure PI' ifPI(UIW) =PI' (U). All the constructions 
given below result in extensions. 
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Ranking functions: Given an unconditional ranking 
function "'· there is a well-known way of extending it to 
a conditional ranking function: 
(UIV) _ { "'(U n V) - "'(V) if "'(V) =j:. oo, "' - undefined if "'(V) = oo. 
This is consistent with the view that if "'(V) = k, then 
tt(V) = Ek, since then "'(UIV) = E"'(UnV)-�<(V). It is easy 
to check that this definition results in a coherent cps. 
the second definition, P.(UnVIW) = P.(U'nVIW) = 0, 
but P.(UIV) > P.(U'IV). 
For Plp, there are two analogous definitions. For the first, 
Plp(UIV) is defined only if tt(V) > 0 for alltt E P, in 
which case Plp(UIV) is fuw. where fuw(tt) = tt(UIV). 
This definition gives a coherent cps, but again, the problem 
is that F' may be small. Thus, in this paper, I use the 
following more general approach. 
First extend Dp by allowing functions which have value 
* (intuitively, * denotes undefined). More precisely, let 
Possibility measures: There are two standard ways of D� consist of all functions f from p to [0, 1] u { *} such defining a conditional possibility measure from an uncon- that f (It) =j:. * for at least one It E p. The idea is to ditional possibility measure Poss. To distinguish them, I define Plp(UIV) = fuw. where fuw(tt) = tt(UIV) if write Poss(UIV) for the first �pproach and Poss(UI IV) for tt(V) > 0 and * otherwise. (Note that this agrees with the second approach. Accordmg to the first approach, the previous definition, which applies only to the situation 
{ Poss(V n U) if Poss(V n U) < Poss(V), where tt(V) > 0 for all It E P .) There is a problem 
Poss(UIV) = 1 if Poss(V n U) = Poss(V) > O, though, one to which I have already alluded, CPll says 
undefined if Poss(V) = 0. that f01V must be .l for all V. Thus, it must be the case 
that f01V1 = f01V2 for all VI, V2 � W. But if It E P and 
VI, V2 � W are such that tt(VI) > 0 and tt(V2) = 0, then The second approach looks more like conditioning in prob­
ability: 
p (UI IV) _ { Poss(V n U)/ Poss(V) if Poss(V) > o, oss - undefined if Poss(V) = 0. 
It is easy to show that both definitions result in coherent 
cps's. (Many other notions of conditioning for possibility 
measures can be defined; see, for example [Fonck 1994]. 
I focus on these two because they are the ones most-often 
considered in the literature.) 
Sets of probabilities: For a set P of probabilities, con­
ditioning can be defined for all the representations of P 
as a plausibility measure. But in each case there are sub­
tle choices involving when conditioning is undefined. For 
example, one definition of conditional lower probability is 
that P.(UIV) is inf{tt(UI V) : tt(V) =f. 0} if tt(V) =f. o for 
alltt E P, and is undefined otherwise (i.e., if tt(V) = 0 for 
some It E P). It is easy to check that P. defined this way 
gives a coherent cpm, as does the corresponding definition 
ofP*. The problem with this definition is that it may result 
in a rather small set F' for which conditioning is defined. 
For example, if for each set V =j:. W, there is some measure 
It E P such that tt(V) = 0 (which can certainly happen in 
some nontrivial examples), then F' = { W}. 
The following definition gives a lower probability which is 
defined on more arguments: 
{ 
inf{tt(UIV) : tt(V) =f. 0} 
p (UIV) = if tt(V) =j:. 0 for some It E P, * undefined 
if tt(V) = 0 for alltt E P. 
It is easy to see that this definition agrees with the first 
one whenever the first is defined and results, in general, in 
a larger set F'. However, the second definition does not 
satisfy CP15. For example, suppose that W = { a, b, c} and 
P = {tt,tt'}, where tt(a) = tt(b) = 0, tt(c) = 1, tt'(a) = 
2/ 3, tt'(b) = 1/ 3, and tt'(c) = 0. Taking V = {a,b}, 
U = {a}, and U' = { b}, it is easy to see that according to 
f01V1 (tt) = 0 and f0w2(tt) =*·so f0w1 =f. f0w2- A similar 
problem arises with CP12. 
To deal with this problem D� must be slightly modified. 
Say that f E D� is e quivalent to .l D;, if f (It) is either 0 or 
* for alltt E P; similarly, f is e quivalent to T D* if f (tt) is p 
either 1 or* for alltt E P. (Since, by definition, f(tt) =j:. * 
for at least one It E P, an element cannot be equivalent to 
both T D;, and .lD;, .) Let Dj, be the same as D� except that 
all elements equivalent to .lD, are identified (and viewed 
as one element) and all elements equivalent to T D* are p 
identified. More precisely, let Dp* = { .lD· , T D* } U {! E p p D' : f is not equivalent toT D* or .lD· }. Define the or-" p 
dering � on Dj, by taking f � g if one of the following 
three conditions holds: 
• f = .lD•, p 
• g = T D1:>· 
• neither f nor g is .lD;, or T D;, and for alltt E P, 
either f(tt) = g(tt) =* or f(tt) =f. *• g(tt) =f.*· and 
f(tt) � g(tt). 
Now define 
Plp(UIV) = 
.lD;, 
T D7:> 
und. 
fuw 
if 3tt E P(tt(V) =j:. 0) and 
Vtt E P(tt(V) =j:. 0 � tt(UIV) = 0), 
if 3tt E P(tt(V) # 0) and 
Vtt E P(tt(V) # 0 � tt(UIV) = 1), 
if tt(V) = 0 for alltt E P, 
otherwise. 
It is easy to check that this gives a coherent cps. I remark 
that a similar construction can be used to convert any FH­
cps to a cps and contruct a conditional plausibility measure 
from an unconditional plausibility measure. I leave details 
to the full paper. 
These constructions for extending an unconditional mea­
sure of likelihood to a cps have two properties that are 
worth abstracting. A cps (W, F, F', PI) is standard if 
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F' = {U : PI(U) =/= ..l}. Note that all the constructions 
of cps's given above result in standard cps's. This follows 
from a more general observation. (W, :F, :F', PI) is deter­
mined by unconditional plausibility if there is a function 
g such that PI(UIV) = g(Pl(U n VIW), Pl(VIW)) for all 
(U, V) E :F x F'. It is almost immediate from the defini­
tions that all the constructions above result in cps's that are 
determined by unconditional plausibility. If an acceptable 
cps is determined by unconditional plausibility, then it must 
be standard. 
Lemma 2.1: If (W, :F, F', Pl) is an acceptable cps de­
termined by unconditional plausibility such that Pl(W) =/= 
Pl(0), then (W, :F, F', Pl) is a standard cps. 
3 ALGEBRAIC CONDITIONAL 
PLAUSIBILITY MEASURES 
To be able to carry out the type of reasoning used in 
Bayesian networks, it does not suffice to just have con­
ditional plausibility. We need to have analogues of addition 
and multiplication. More precisely, there needs to be some 
way of computing the plausibility of the union of two dis­
joint sets in terms of the plausibility of the individual sets 
and a way of computing Pl(U n VIV') given PI(UIV n V') 
and PI(VIV'). 
A cps (W, :F, F', PI) where PI has rangeD is algebraic if it 
is acceptable and there are functions EB : D x D -t D and 
0 : D x D -t D such that the following properties hold: 
Algl. If U, U' E :F are disjoint and V E F'. then Pl(U U 
U'IV) = PI(UIV) EB PI(U'IV). 
Alg2. If U E :F, V n V' E F', then Pl(U n VIV') = 
Pl(UIV n V') 0 PI(VIV'). 
Alg3. 0 distributes over EB, more precisely, a 0 (b EBb') = 
(a 0 b) EB (a 0 b') if (a, b), (a, b'), (a, b EB b') E 
Dom(0) and (b, b'), (a0b, a0b') E Dom(EB)), where 
Dom(EB) = { (PI(UIV), PI(U'IV)) : U, U' E :F are 
disjoint and V E F'} and Dom(0) = { (PI(UIV n 
V'),Pl(VIV')) : U E :F, V n V' E F'}. 
Alg4. If(a, c), (b, c) E Dom(0),a0c :S b0c,andc =/= ..l, 
then a :S b. 
I sometimes refer to the cpm PI as being algebraic as well. 
It may seem more natural to consider a stronger version of 
Alg4 that applies to all pairs in D x D, such as 
Alg4'. If a 0 c :S b 0 c and c =/= ..l, then a :S b. 
However, as Proposition 3.1 below shows, by requiring 
that Alg3 and Alg4 hold only for tuples in Dom( EB) and 
Dom(0) rather than on all tuples in D x D, some cps's 
of interest become algebraic that would otherwise not be. 
Intuitively, we care about EB and 0 mainly to the extent that 
Alg 1 and Alg2 hold, and they apply to tuples in Dom( EB) and 
Dom( 0 ), respectively. Thus, it does not seem unreasonable 
that properties like Alg3 and Alg4 be required to hold only 
for these tuples. 
Proposition 3.1: The constructions for extending an uncon­
ditional probability measure, ranking function, possibility 
measure (using either Poss(UIV) or Poss(UIIV)J, and the 
plausibility measure Plp defined by a set P of probability 
measures to a cps result in algebraic cps s. 1 
Proof: It is easy to see that in each case the cps is acceptable. 
It is also easy to find appropriate notions of 0 and EB in 
the case of probability measures, ranking functions, and 
possibility measures using Poss(UIV). For probability, 
clearly EB and 0 are + and x (more precisely, a EB b = 
min( 1, a+ b)); for ranking, EB and 0 are min and+; for 
Poss(UIIV), EB is max and 0 is x. I leave it to the reader 
to check that Alg 1-4 hold in all these cases. 
For Poss(UIV), EB is again max and ® is min. Note that 
if (a, b) E Do m( min), then either a < b or a = 1. For 
suppose that (a, b) = (Poss(UIVn V'), Poss(VIV'), where 
U E :F and VnV' E F'. IfPoss(UnVnV') = Poss(Vn 
V') thena = Poss(UIVnV') = 1; otherwise,Poss(UnVn 
V') < Poss(V n V'), in which case a =  Poss(UIV n V') = 
Poss(UnVnV') < Poss(VnV') :S Poss(VIV') =b. It is 
easy to check Alg1-3. While min does not satisfy Alg4'­
certainly min( a, c) = min(b, c) does not in general imply 
that a = b-Alg4 does hold. For if min( a, c) :S min(b, c) 
and a = 1, then clearly b = 1. Alternatively, if a < c, then 
min( a, c) = a and the only way that a :S min(b, c) , given 
that b < c or b = 1, is if a :S b. 
Finally, for Pip, EB and ® are essentially pointwise ad­
dition and multiplication. However, we must be a little 
careful in dealing with T D* , ..lD· , and *· The definition 1' 1' 
of EB is relatively straightforward. Define f EB T D* = 1' 
T D;, EB f = T D;, and f EB ..lD;, = ..lD;, EB f = f. 
If j, g n {..lD· , T D* } = 0, then f EB g = h, where 1' 1' 
h( f.l) = min(1, f( f.l) + g( f.l)) (taking a+* =*+ a =* 
and min( 1, *) = * ). In a similar spirit, define f 0 T D;, = 
T D;, ® f = f and f 0 ..lD;, = ..lD;, 0 f = ..lD;,; 
if {f,g} n {..lD;,, TD;,} = 0, then f ® g = h, where 
h( f.l) = f( f.l) x g( f.l) (taking* x a =  ax* =*). I leave 
it to the reader to check that, with these definitions, Alg 1-
4 hold (although note that the restrictions to Dom( EB) and 
Dom( ®) are required for both Alg3 and Alg4 to hold). I 
Conditional belief and (conditional) lower probability are 
not algebraic. There is no analogue to either EB or ®. For 
example, in the case of lower probability, it is not hard to 
construct pairwise disjoint sets U1, V1, Uz, and Vz and a 
set P of probability measures such that P*(Ui) = P*( Vi) 
(and P*(Ui) = P*( Vi)) fori = 1, 2, but P*(U1 U Uz) =/= 
P*(V1 U V2). That means there cannot be a function EB in 
the case of lower probability. Similar remarks hold for ® 
and for belief functions. 
I conclude this section by showing that a standard algebraic 
cps that satisfies one other minimal property must also sat­
isfy CPI5. Say that ® is monotonic if d :S d' and e :S e' 
then d 0 e :S d' ® e'. A cpm (cps) is monotonic if® is. 
1 Essentially the same result is proved in [Friedman and Halpern 
1995] for all cases but Pip. 
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Lemma 3.2: A standard algebraic monotonic cps satisfies 
C P15. 
4 INDEPENDENCE 
How can we capture formally the notion that two events 
are independent? Intuitively, it means that they have noth­
ing to do with each other-they are totally unrelated; the 
occurrence of one has no influence on the other. None of 
the representations of uncertainty that we have been consid­
ering can express the notion of "unrelatedness" (whatever 
it might mean) directly. The best we can do is to capture 
the "footprint" of independence on the notion. For exam­
ple, in the case of probability, if U and V are unrelated, 
it seems reasonable to expect that learning U should not 
affect the probability of V and symmetrically, learning V 
should not affect the probability of U. "Unrelatedness" 
is, after all, a symmetric notion. 2 The fact that U and V 
are probabilistically independent (with respect to probabil­
ity measure Jt) can thus be expressed as Jt(UIV) = Jt(U) 
and Jt(VIU) = Jt(V). There is a technical problem with 
this definition: What happens if Jt(V) = 0? In that case 
Jt(UIV) is undefined. Similarly, if Jt(U) = 0 then Jt(VIU) 
is undefined. It is conventional to say that, in this case, U 
and V are still independent. This leads to the following 
formal definition. 
Definition 4.1: U and V are probabilistically independent 
(with respect to probability measure Jt) if Jt(V) i= 0 implies 
Jt(UIV) = Jt(U) and Jt(U) i= 0 implies Jt(VjU) = Jt(V). 
I 
This does not look like the standard definition of inde­
pendence in texts, but an easy calculation shows that it is 
equivalent. 
Proposition 4.2: The following are equivalent: 
(a) Jt(U) i= 0 implies Jt(VjU) = Jt(V), 
(b) Jt(U n V) = Jt(U)Jt(V), 
(c) Jt(V) i= 0 implies Jt(UIV) = Jt(U). 
Thus, in the case of probability, it would be equivalent 
to say that U and V are independent with respect to Jt if 
Jt(U n V) = Jt(U)Jt(V) or to require only that Jt(UIV) = 
Jt(U) ifJ.t(V) i= Owithout requiring thatJ.L(VjU) = Jt(V) if 
Jt(U) i= 0. However, these equivalences do not necessarily 
hold for other representations of uncertainty. The definition 
of independence I have given here seems to generalize more 
appropriately. 3 
2Walley [1991] calls the asymmetric notion irrelevance and 
defines U being independent of V as U is irrelevant to V and V 
is irrelevant to U. Although my focus here is independence, I do 
not mean to suggest that irrelevance is uninteresting. 
3 Another property of probabilistic independence is that if U 
is independent of V then V is independent of V. This too does 
not follow for the other representations of uncertainty, and Wal­
ley [1991] actually makes this part of his definition. Adding this 
The definition of probabilistic conditional independence is 
analogous. 
Definition 4.3: U and V are probabilistically independent 
given V' (with respect to probability measure Jt) if Jt(V n 
V') i= OimpliesJ.L(UIVnV') = Jt(UIV') andJ.L(UnV') i= 
o implies Jt(VIU n V') = Jt(VIV'). I 
It is immediate that U and V are (probabilistically) inde­
pendent iff they are independent conditional on W. 
The generalization to conditional plausibility measures (and 
hence to all other representations of uncertainty that we have 
been considering) is straightforward. 
Definition 4.4: Given a cps (W, F, F', PI), U, V E F are 
plausibilistically independent given V' E F (with respect 
to the cpm Pl), written lp,(U, VIV'), if V n V' E F' im­
plies PI(UIV n V') = PI(UIV') and U n V' E F' implies 
PI(VjU n V') = PI(VIV'). I 
We are interested in conditional independence of random 
variables as well as in conditional independence of events. 
All the standard definitions extend to plausibility in a 
straightforward way. As usual, a random variable X on 
W is a function from W to the reals. Let R( X) be the set 
of possible values for X (that is, the set of values over which 
X ranges). As usual, X =  xis the event{w : X(w) = x}. 
If X = { X  1, . . .  , X k} is a set of random variables and 
x = (x1, ... , xk ) , let X= x be an abbreviation for the 
event x, = x, n . . .  n xk n Xk. A random variable is mea­
surable with respect to cps (W, F, F', PI) if X = x E F 
for all x E R( X). For the rest of the paper, I assume that all 
random variables X are measurable and that R(X) is finite 
for all random variables X. Random variables X andY are 
independent with respect to plausibility measure PI if the 
events X = x andY = y are independent for all x E R( X) 
andy E R(Y). More generally, given sets X, Y, and Z of 
random variables, X and Y are plausibilistically indepen­
dent given Z (with respect to PI), denoted I;t(X, YjZ), if 
lp1(X = x ,  Y = xiZ = z) for all x, y, and z. (Note that 
I am using lp1 for conditional independence of events and 
I;t for conditional independence of random variables.) If 
Z = 0, then I;t(X, YIZ) if X and Y are unconditionally 
independent, that is, if lp1(X = x, Y = xjW) for all x, y; 
if either X = 0 or Y = 0, then [Tv (X, YIZ) is taken to be 
vacuously true. 
Now consider the following four properties of random vari­
ables, called the semi-graphoid properties [Pearl 1988], 
where X, Y, and Z are pairwise disjoint sets of variables. 
CIRVl. If I;t(X, YIZ) then I;t(Y, XIZ). 
CIRV2. If I;t(X, Y u Y'IZ) then I;t(X, YjZ). 
CIRV3. If I;t(X, Y u Y'IZ) then lpt(X, YIY' u Z). 
CIRV4. If I;t(X, YjZ) and I;t(X, Y'IY u Z) then 
lpt(X, Y u Y'IZ). 
requirement would not affect any of the results here, although it 
would make the proofs somewhat lengthier, so I have not made it 
part of the definition. 
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It is well known that CIRV 1-4 hold for probability mea­
sures. The following result generalizes this. The proof is 
not difficult, although care must be taken to show that the 
result depends only on the properties of algebraic cpm's. 
Theorem 4.5: CJRV 1-4 hold for all algebraic cps s. 
Theorem 4.5, of course, is very dependent on the definition 
of conditional independence given here. Other notions of 
independence have been studied in the literature for specific 
representations of uncertainty. There is a general approach 
called noninteractivity, which was originally defined in the 
context of possibility measures by Zadeh [ 1978] but makes 
sense for any algebraic cpm. U and V do not interact given 
V' (with respect to Pl ), denoted Nlp1(U, VJV') if V' E :F' 
implies thatPI(UnVjV') = Pl(UJV')0Pl(VJV').4 Fonck 
[1994] shows that noninteraction is strictly weaker than in­
dependence for a number of notions of independence for 
possibility measures. The following result shows that non­
interaction implies independence for all algebraic cpm's. 
Lemma 4.6: If (W, :F, :F', PI) is an algebraic cps, then 
lp1(U, VJV') implies Nlpt(U, VJV'). 
What about the converse to Lemma 4.6? The results of 
Fonck show that it does not hold in general-indeed, it 
does not hold for Poss(UJV). So what is required for 
noninteractivity to imply independence? The following 
lemma provides a sufficient condition. 
Lemma 4.7 : If (W, :F, :F', PI) is a standard alge­
braic cps that satisfies Alg4', then Nlp1(U, VJV') implies 
lp1(U, VJV'). 
The fact that noninteractivity and conditional independence 
coincide for the conditional plausibility spaces constructed 
from unconditional probability measures, ranking func­
tions, and possibility measures using Poss(UIJV) follows 
from Lemmas 4.6 and 4.7. Since neither Poss(UJV) nor 
Plp satisfy Alg4', it is perhaps not surprising that in neither 
case does noninteractivity imply conditional independence. 
(We shall shortly see an example in the case of Plp; Fonck 
[1994] gives examples in the case of Poss(UJV).) 
It is easy to see that the assumption of standardness is 
necessary in Lemma 4.7. For suppose that (W, :F, :F', PI) 
is a nonstandard algebraic cps for which T i= L Since 
(W, :F, :F', PI) is nonstandard, there must exist some U E 
:F' such that Pl(UIW) = .L But then 
l_ = PI(01W) = Pl(01U) 0 Pl(UIW) = l_ 0 _L. 
Thus 
Pl(UIW) = l_ = l_ 0 l_ = Pl(UIW) 0 Pl(UIW) , 
so Nlp1(U, UIW). But Pl(UIU) = T i= l_ = Pl(U), so 
lp1(U, UIW) does not hold. 
In general, Theorem 4.5 does not hold if we use Nlp1 rather 
than /PI· Besides noninteractivity, a number of different 
4Shenoy [1994] defines a notion similar in spirit to noninter­
activity for random variables. 
approaches to defining independence for possibility mea­
sures [Campos and Huete 1999a; Campos and Huete 1999b; 
Dubois, Farinas del Cerro, Herzig, and Prade 1994] and 
for sets of probability measures [Campos and Huete 1993; 
Campos and Moral1995; Couso, Moral, and Walley 1999] 
have been considered. In general, Theorem 4.5 does not 
hold for them either. It is beyond the scope of this paper 
to discuss and compare these approaches to that considered 
here, but it is instructive to consider independence for sets 
of probability measures in a little more detail, especially for 
the representation PIp. 
lp1P is very close to a notion called type-1 independence 
considered by de Campos and Moral [1995]. U and V are 
type-] independent conditional on V' with respect toP if 
U and V are independent conditional on V' with respect 
to every J.L E P. It is easy to check that /Pip (U, VJV') 
implies that U and V are type-1 independent conditional 
on V' (and similarly for random variables); however, the 
converse does not necessarily hold, because the two ap­
proaches treat conditioning on events that have probability 
0 according to some (but not all) of the measures in P 
differently. To see this, consider an example discussed 
by de Campos and Moral. Suppose a coin is known 
to be either double-headed or double-tailed and is tossed 
twice. This can be represented by P = {J.Lo, J.LI }, where 
J.Lo(hh) = 1 and J.Lo(ht) = J.Lo(th) = J.Lo(tt) = 0, while 
J.LI(tt) = 1 and J.LI(ht) = J.LI(th) = J.L(hh) = 0. Let X1 
and X2 be the random variables representing the outcome 
of the first and second coin tosses, respectively. Clearly 
there is a functional dependence between X1 and X2, but 
it is easy to check that X1 and Xz are type-1 indepen­
dent with respect toP. Moreover, noninteractivity holds: 
Nlp1(X1 = i, X2 = j) holds for i,j E {h, t}. On the 
other hand, JPip (X1, X2) does not hold. For example, 
fx,=h(J.LI) = 0 while fx,=hiX2=h(J.LI) = *· 
S BAYESIAN NETWORKS 
Throughout this section, I assume that we start with a set 
W of possible worlds characterized by n binary random 
variables X = { X1, ... , Xn} (or, equivalently, n prim­
itive propositions). That is, a world w E W is a tuple 
(x1, • . •  , Xn), where x; E { 0 , 1} is the value of X;. That 
means that there are 2n worlds in W, say w1 , .. . , Wzn .5 Let 
P .C consist of all algebraic cps's of the form (W, :F, :F', PI) 
determined by unconditional plausibility by some fixed 
function g, where :F = 2 w, so that all subsets of W are 
measurable. Thus, for example, P .C could consist of any 
of the families of conditional plausibility measures con­
structed in Section 2. If (W, :F, :F', PI) E P .C, the cpm 
PI can be described by giving Pl(w) for each of the 2n 
worlds w in W. (Since PI is algebraic, the unconditional 
plausibility of a set of worlds is determined by the uncon­
ditional plausibility of individual worlds in the set; since PI 
is determined by unconditional plausibility, this suffices to 
determine all conditional plausibilities.) The goal of this 
5The assumption that the random variables are binary is just 
for ease of exposition. It is easy to generalize the results to the 
case where R( X;) is finite for each X;. 
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section is to show that many of the tools of Bayesian net­
work technology can be applied in this setting. Almost all 
the results follow easily from Theorem 4.5 and well-known 
results in the literature (mainly in [Geiger and Pearl I 988; 
Geiger, Verma, and Pearl I 990; Verma I 986]), so I just 
sketch the details here. 
Because PI is algebraic, the chain rule holds. In particular, 
it follows from Alg2 that 
Pl(XI =XI n .. . n Xn = Xn) = 
Pl(Xn = XniXI =XI n . . .  n Xn-I = Xn-d0 
Pl(Xn -I = Xn-II XI =XI n . . .  n Xn-2 = Xn-2)0 
... 0 Pl(X2 = x2I XI =xi) 0 Pl(XI =xi). 
( I) 
Strictly speaking, I should put in parentheses here, 
since nothing in Alg I-4 forces 0 to be associa­
tive. However, it follows easily from Alg2 that 0 
is in fact associative on tuples (a, b, c) of the form 
(Pl(UdU2), Pl(U2IU3), Pl(U3IU4)), where UI � U2 � 
U3 � U4 (see also [Friedman and Halpern I 995]), which are 
the only types of tuples that arise in ( I ), so the parentheses 
can safely be omitted. 
As usual, a (qualitative) Bayesian network (over X) is a dag 
whose nodes are labeled by variables in X. The standard 
notion of a Bayesian network representing a probability 
measure [Pearl I 988] can be generalized in the obvious 
way to plausibility. 
Definition 5.1: Given a qualitative Bayesian network G, 
let Para( X) be the parents of the random variable X in 
G; let Desa( X) be all the descendants of X, that is, X 
and all those nodes Y such that X is an ancestor of Y ;  let 
NonDesa(X), the nondescendants of X, consist of X­
Desa(X). Note that all ancestors of X are nondescendants 
of X. The Bayesian network G is compatible with Pl if 
I;;](X, NonDesa(X)IPar(X)), that is, X is conditionally 
independent of its nondescendants given its parents, for all 
X EX. I 
A quantitative Bayesian network is a pair ( G, f) consisting 
of a qualitative Bayesian network G and a function f that 
associates with each node X in G a conditional plausibility 
table ( cpt) that quantifies the effects of the parents of X on 
X. There is an entry in D (the range of PI) in the cpt for 
each possible setting of the parents of X. Intuitively, the 
entries in the cpt for X describe the plausibility that X = 1 
conditional on all the possible values of X's parents. If X 
is a root of G, then the cpt for X can be thought of as giving 
the unconditional plausibility that X = I .  
Definition 5.2: A quantitative Bayesian network ( G, f) 
is compatible with Pl if G qualitatively represents f..L and 
the cpts agree with PI, in the sense that, for each random 
variable X, the entry in the cpt for X given some setting 
YI = YI, . . .  , Yk = Yk of its parents is Pl(X = I IYI = 
YIn .. . n Yk = Yk) ifYI =YIn . . .  n Yk = Yk E :F'. (It 
does not matter what the cpt entry forYI = YI. ... , Yk = Yk 
is ifYI =YIn ... n Yk = Yk � F'.) I 
It follows from (1) and Alg1 that PI can be reconstructed 
from a quantitative Bayesian network representing Pl. 
There is a standard way of constructing a Bayesian net­
work that represents a probability measure [Pearl I 988]. 
Let YI, . . .  , Yn be a permutation of the random variables in 
X. Construct a qualitative Bayesian network as follows: 
For each k, find a minimal subset of {YI , . . .  , Yk-d. call 
it Pb such that lP"t({YI, . . .  ,Yk-d,YkiPk). Then add 
edges from each of the nodes in P k to Yk. Call the result­
ing graph G. Verma [ I986] shows that this construction 
gives a Bayesian network compatible with PI in the case of 
probability; his proof depends only on CIRV I-4. Thus, the 
construction works for algebraic cpm's. 
Theorem 5.3: If PI is an algebraic cpm, then G is compat­
ible with Pl. 
Just as in the case of probability, conditional independencies 
can be read off the Bayesian network using the criterion of 
d-separation [Pearl 1988]. Recall that a set X of nodes in 
G is d-separated from a set Y of nodes by a set Z of nodes 
if, for every X E X, Y E Y, and undirected path from X 
toY (an undirected path is a path that ignores the arrows), 
there is a node Z' on the path such that either: 
(a) Z' E Z and there is an arrow on the path leading in to 
Z' and an arrow leading out; 
(b) Z' E Z and has both path arrows leading out; or 
(c) Z' has both path arrows leading in, and neither Z' nor 
any of its descendants are in Z. 
Let La,PI consist of all statements of the form 
lP"{( NonDesa(X), XIPara(X)). Consider the following 
three statements: 
1. d-sep0(X, YIZ). 
2. Ipt( X, YIZ) is provable from CIRV1-4 and La,PI· 
3. Ip-{( X, YIZ) holds for every plausibility measure in 
P .C compatible with G. 
The implication from 1 to 2 is proved in [Geiger, Verma, 
and Pearl 1990; Verma 1986]. 
Theorem 5.4: [Geiger, Verma, and Pearl 1990; Verma 
1986] lf d-sep0(X, YIZ), then If,Y(X, YIZ) is provable from 
CIRV/-4 and La,PI· 
It is immediate from Theorem 4.5 that the implication from 
2 to 3 holds for algebraic cpm's. 
Corollary 5.5: If If,Y(X, YIZ) is provable from CIRV/-4 
and La,PJ, then If,Y (X , Y IZ) holds for every algebraic cpm 
PI compatible with G. 
Finally, the implication from 3 to 1 for probability mea­
sures is proved in [Geiger and Pearl 1988; Geiger, Verma, 
and Pearl 1990]. Here I generalize the proof to algebraic 
plausibility measures. Notice that to prove the implication 
from 3 to 1, it suffices to show that if X is not d-separated 
from Y by Z in G, then there is a plausibility measure 
PI E P.C such that Ip-{(X, YIZ) does not hold. To guar­
antee that such a plausibility measure exists in P .C, we 
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have to ensure that there are "enough" plausibility mea­
sures in P £ in the following technical sense. P £ is rich 
if for all pairs (d, d') E D such that d � d' i= l_v, 
there exists Pld,d' E P £ and sets U, V � W such that 
Pl(U n VIW ) = d and Pl(VIW ) = d'. All the con­
structions given in Section 2 for constructing cps's from 
unconditional measures of likelihood result in rich cps's. 
Theorem S.u Suppose that P £is rich. Then if Ipy (X, YIZ) 
holds for every plausibility measure in P £ compatible with 
G, then d-sepc(X, YIZ). 
6 CONCLUSION 
I have considered a general notion of conditional plausibil­
ity that generalizes all other standard notions of condition­
ing in the literature, and examined various requirements that 
could be imposed on conditional plausibility. One set of re­
quirements, those that lead to algebraic cps's, was shown 
to suffice for the construction of Bayesian networks. It 
should also be clear that standard constructions like belief 
propagation in Bayesian networks [Pearl 1988] can also be 
applied to algebraic cps's, since they typically use only ba­
sic properties of conditioning, addition, and multiplication, 
all of which hold in algebraic cps's (using EB and 0 ). In 
particular, these results apply to sets to probability mea­
sures, provided that they are appropriately represented as 
plausibility measures. The particular representation of sets 
of probability measures advocated in this paper was also 
shown to have a number of other attractive properties. 
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